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I. Introduction
In the last four decades, Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) have grown from a relatively
little used form of corporate strategy into a preferred form of corporate development for many
companies. For instance, in 2004, 30,000 acquisitions were completed at an aggregate value of
$1900 B (Heijltjes). For reference, this is just less than one-fifth the United States GDP in the
same year. For many firms, M&As are a way to grow and develop their business lines without
having to engage in costly, time-consuming, and unpredictable research and development and
organic growth. Mergers can take on two general forms: horizontal mergers, in which
companies combine with related companies in order to achieve economies of scale, and vertical
mergers, in which companies of unrelated businesses combine to create economies of scope.
Despite their continually growing popularity, M&As have seen a consistently high failure
rate. A study conducted by John Kitching in 1974 suggests a 46-50% failure rate of M&As, selfreported by firm executives. A 1994 study showed little progress two decades later, reporting a
44-45% failure rate using the same methodology as the 1974 study (Cartwright). A 2005
McKinsey study cited that 70% of mergers fail to achieve expected revenue synergies and 40%
do not reach their cost synergy expectations (Allred).
If M&As are so popular, why do they have such high failure rates? Varying sources
propose a variety of reasons, including unforeseeable financial and market factors (Heijltjes), but
a common conclusion identifies the implementation and integration process of the M&A as a
main culprit. In their 2005 article for The Academy of Management Executive, Brent Allred and
colleagues even liken the cultural integration of two firms to the formation of stepfamilies and
the challenges associated with this process: Biological Discrimination, Incomplete
Institutionalization, and Deficit-Comparison (Allred). Specifically, recent M&A research shows
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that the cultural integration of the two firms and, as a subset of this, the retention and integration
of top management teams are crucial components of ensuring a successful M&A transaction
(Harding).
The issue of retaining and integrating members of top management teams seems to be a
salient factor, considering that various studies have confirmed a 70-75% departure rate of
executives within five years of a merger (Cartwright, Siehl). This phenomenon can be explained
by a variety of reasons: perhaps the merger was meant as a fresh start for the two companies
involved, and the departure of key executives was symbolic of this change. Or, more commonly
suggested, professional and personal clashes between the members of the merging executive
teams leads, more often than not, to hostile departures.
If the departure rate of executives post-merger is so high, does this make the initial
decision of leadership succession particularly important in determining the success of the merged
company? M&A literature hosts two schools of thought on this issue: Organizational Ecology
proponents suggest that company performance is not significantly linked to leadership factors.
In contrast, Impact of Strategic Choice supporters contend that the choice in leader does have
significant impact on company performance (Heijltjes).
For most M&As, the choice of leader is not in doubt, as typical M&As have a clear
acquiring firm and target firm. In such cases, the top executive of the acquiring firm simply
retains this position in the merged firm. However, for a small segment of mergers denoted
Mergers of Equals (MOEs), this distinction is not so easy.
According to Julie Wulf, a professor at Harvard Business School, in her 2001 paper “Do
CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence From ‘Mergers of Equals,’” mergers of
equals are “friendly mergers generally characterized by extensive pre-merger negotiations
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between two firms closer in size that result in approximately equal board representation in the
merged firm” (Wulf). Additionally, she identifies that, from the period 1991-1999, while MOEs
only accounted for 2% of the number of M&A transactions, they accounted for 10% of the value
of these transactions, suggesting that, despite their relative rarity, these types of mergers engage
significant company value. More generally, MOEs have the following characteristics:

•

There is no explicitly designated acquiring or target firm

•

Both companies are represented equally on the Board of Directors of the merged
company

•

Shareholders from each of the original companies retain ownership in the merged entity

•

There is no explicit premium paid to either side as a result of the merger

As suggested by the name, many MOEs are mergers between companies that are relatively
similar in size prior to the merger; however, MOEs as of yet remain a relatively little-researched
phenomenon, and so there do not exist generally accepted numerical criteria for designating a
merger as an MOE.

Some better-known MOEs in recent decades include:

	
  

•

Travelers Group and Citicorp, forming Citigroup (1998)

•

Bell Atlantic and GTE, forming Verizon Communications (2000)

•

Martin Marietta and Lockheed Corporations, forming Lockheed Martin (1995)
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There are a number of reasons why companies might choose to engage specifically in an
MOE as opposed to a typical M&A transaction, in which there is a clear target and acquiring
company. First of all, MOEs present a sense of equality between the two merging companies in
a way that suggests that both companies will benefit from the merger. Additionally, MOEs are a
better way of preserving employee morale, as neither company is identified as being the
“acquired” or lesser company. Because of these reasons, some view MOEs as facilitating the
post-merger integration process by promoting a “cooperative” rather than “competitive”
environment between the merging parties. In fact, according to Israel Drori and colleagues in
their paper “Cultural Clashes in a ‘Merger of Equals’: The Case of High-Tech Start-ups” (2011),
“arguments about equality in mergers have indicated that this type of phenomenon is merely a
symbolic gesture aimed at defusing potential conflicts and smoothing cultural differences” (Drori
et. al.).
The nature of MOEs, then, presents a particularly interesting and extreme case study of
leadership succession in mergers. Because the two merging companies are, for all intents and
purposes, “equal,” the process of choosing and implementing leadership succession is much
more complex than a typical merger. This paper will examine the impact of leadership
succession in MOEs, specifically examining whether particular characteristics of leadership
succession in these types of mergers are significantly correlated with ultimate financial success.

	
  

Leadership Succession in a Merger of Equals (Cheng) - 5

II. Methodology
Identifying the MOEs
Data for this study was based off Wulf’s 2001 study. In her study, Wulf identifies all
MOEs from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999. Her criteria in identifying general
acquisitions are as follows:

1. Both firms are publicly traded and listed on the Center for Research in Securities Prices
(CRSP) database
2. The merger is not classified as a share repurchase, a self-tender, or a sale of minority
interest
3. The type of merger is classified as either a stock swap or a tender offer transaction

These criteria yielded 1730 data points during the designated time period. From this dataset, she
identified MOEs using criteria established by the Securities Data Company (SDC):

1. The two firms publicly announce the merger as an MOE
2. The two firms have approximately the same pre-merger market capitalization
3. The ownership of the new entity will be owned approximately 50/50 by each company’s
shareholders
4. Both companies should have approximately equal representation on the board of directors
of the new company.
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The SDC identified 53 MOEs during the time period of study, from which Wulf further
narrowed the data down to 40 mergers she classified as MOEs [See Appendix A].
From these 40 MOEs, it was necessary to further clean the data for the purposes of this study.
Because this study aimed to evaluate the long-term financial success of these MOEs, it was
necessary that all MOE data points in the study had distinguishable financial records over the
chosen period of examination, 10 years.1 Based on these criteria, 24 of the original 40 MOEs
were eliminated from the dataset for the following reasons:

1. 5 of the MOEs in Wulf’s original data set were never completed. Some were blocked by
government anti-trust regulations while others just did not reach an agreement deemed
suitable by the parties involved.
2. 17 of the MOEs later merged with other companies in such a way that the financial data
of the original MOE became indistinguishable.2
3. 2 of the MOEs ultimately failed as companies, either going bankrupt and ceasing to exist
or being acquired by private equity firms for extensive restructuring.

As such, 16 MOEs remained for the purposes of this study [See Appendix B].

Collecting data on MOE characteristics
After identifying the data points of study, I then obtained data regarding the leadership
succession of each of the MOEs. The factors of leadership succession that I identified for each
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10 years was chosen to maximize the evaluation of existing financial returns. The last MOE in the original dataset occurred in
2000, so a 10-year timeline ensured that all financial data would be available if the company’s financials were still retrievable.
2
A general rule of thumb for eliminating data points on this criteria was whether or not the MOE was smaller than the company
with which it was merging in the subsequent merger. It can thus effectively be assumed that the original MOE was absorbed into
another company and took on the identity of this new company or at least an identity that can no longer be reconciled with the
original MOE.	
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MOE were factors that I thought might have a notable relationship with later financial success of
the merged company. Initially, I hypothesized that the following characteristics of MOE
leadership succession would be significantly linked with financial returns:

Form of new leadership: Does the company employ co-CEOs after the MOE or does it
transition directly to a single CEO? The reasoning for this factor is that co-CEOs may allow for
a smoother transition culturally; it is likely best received by employees because a co-CEOship
most accurately reflects the composition of the firm at that time. On the other hand, a co-CEO
structure may compromise efficiency and agility that is also important for a successful postmerger integration.

New CEO retention: How long does the leader(s) installed as a result of the merger remain in
post after the merger? Depending on the nature of the merger, certain CEO appointments may
simply be to ensure a smooth merger and therefore the individuals are replaced once the
company has reached a steady state. On the other hand, having a consistent CEO who sees the
company through the merger and ensuing stability may lead to greater financial returns.

Outcome of unsuccessful CEO: If there an unsuccessful CEO (i.e., a CEO from one of the
original companies that is not chosen as CEO of the merged company), is this individual retained
in another management position or released from the company? If the individual is retained, this
may serve to appease the half of the merged company that originally worked for this CEO, thus
better fostering cultural integration. However, if the leadership styles of the two CEOs vying for
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the top spot are incompatible, the unsuccessful of the two may be a liability to the management
team if retained.

New CEO’s tenure in pre-merger company: Is the individual who is chosen as the new CEO a
veteran of the company or someone brought on specifically for the merger? It is possible that
internal support for a CEO is positively correlated with that individual’s tenure in the pre-merger
company and subsequently reflected in financial returns. For example, employees may vie
harder for their CEO to be granted the top position if he or she is a veteran of the original
company and therefore is seen to “deserve” it. Additionally, according to Roberto Weber and
Colin Camerer in their 2003 article for Management Science “Cultural Conflict and Merger
Failure,” a more tenured leader might offer more organizational memory. Remembering how
culture was first established in the pre-merger company may allow such a leader to better
oversee the cultural integration of the merged company (Weber). On the other hand, company
veterans, while well-versed on the operations of their original companies, may be too entrenched
in traditional methodologies to successfully support a merger, especially an MOE.

These were the four variables on which I initially chose to examine the 16 MOEs.
However, over the course of collecting data, it became evident that additional variables could
add valuable color to the study. Specifically:

If co-CEOs, intended resulting new CEO? As a subset of “Form of new leadership,” if coCEOs were employed as a post-merger strategy, did the company identify a clear succession plan
between the co-CEOs? While imperfect, if such a plan existed it was typically disclosed in
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media coverage of the merger; a succession plan between co-CEOs might suggest that the
company is likely to have taken other measures to facilitate post-merger integration and boost
financial returns.

If unsuccessful retained, hostile resignation? As a subset of “Outcome of Unsuccessful CEO,”
if there was an unsuccessful CEO and that CEO was retained immediately after the merger, was
there a later hostile resignation of this individual? Similar to “If co-CEOs, intended resulting
new CEO?,” this factor relied on media reports of such hostile resignations, which are imperfect
given that hostile resignations may have been shielded from the public in the interests of
preserving internal relations and public relations. However, over the course of collecting data,
the prevalence of public reporting on hostile resignations was such that it seemed appropriate to
include this as an additional data point.

Data for these factors were obtained from SEC filings, company issuances, and media
coverage and these data were then translated into numerical values [See Appendix C].
Of these initial findings, notably, the co-CEO form of leadership succession is relatively
prevalent, with 6 of the 16 MOEs employing co-CEOs as a direct result of the merger. Also, all
but one of these 6 MOEs with co-CEOs had a publicized succession plan identifying which CEO
was going to take on the full capacity of CEO within a designated time period. The one MOE
that did not have this such distinction was Citigroup; however, the company did transition to a
single CEO structure two years after its merger, so it is possible company had such an
established succession plan but just did not disclose it publicly.3 This seems to suggest that,
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As such, all MOEs employing a co-CEO structure do identify or later reveal which CEO is the “ultimate” CEO, which allows
data collection for the other factors under question, in which the distinction of this “ultimate CEO” is necessary.
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regardless of the actual financial returns connected with this tactic, the co-CEO leadership
structure is favored for merger integration, yet companies do not view it as sustainable in the
long term. For all MOEs that used a co-CEO structure, the individual designated the “ultimate”
CEO was assumed for data collection on other MOE factors to be the “new CEO” (i.e., these
individuals were used to calculate “Length of New CEO retention” and “New CEO Tenure in
pre-merger company, etc.).
The data collected for “Length of new CEO retention” varies, with the shortest length of
CEO retention post-merger being one year and the longest being 14 years. The new CEO tenure
in pre-merger company is similarly varied, with the shortest tenure being 1 year and the longest
tenure being 22 years. These variances may reflect the purposes of these individual CEOs for
their companies: those with short tenure or short retention may have been brought on solely for
the merger, while those with long tenure or long retention were meant as more permanent
company figures. Areas of further study might examine the correlation between these two
factors.
Finally, because all MOEs in the dataset that employed a co-CEO structure ultimately
transitioned to a single CEO setup at some point after the merger, it was possible to identify an
“unsuccessful CEO” for each MOE. All but two of the 16 MOEs retained their unsuccessful
CEOs, suggesting that this is a good strategy, whether for morale or public relations purposes.
Notably, seven of these MOEs that retained their unsuccessful CEOs later experienced hostile
resignations. As mentioned before, this is an imperfect measure due to the subjectivity and
selectivity of what is released to the media, but if anything this is likely an underestimation of the
true number of hostile resignations.
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Financial returns
After assigning values to each of these leadership succession factors for the MOEs, I then
obtained the corresponding financial data. In order to evaluate the “financial success” of these
firms, I used the market-adjusted return (MAR), in which the company’s returns are adjusted for
the returns of the index:
MARjt = Rjt – Rmt
(Dennis and McConnell)
For each MOE identified, I collected the monthly MAR over the course of ten years,
starting from the month of the merger. Controlling for year-specific factors, the MAR data was
then correlated across the leadership succession factor values for each corresponding MOE.

III. Findings
The results yielded insignificant relationships between each of the leadership succession
factors and the long-term financial returns of the MOEs. The multivariate regression is as
follows:

MAR = -0.04 + 0.000137 * [Time] + 0.020265 * [co-CEOship] – 0.002127 * [If co-CEO,
intended resulting new CEO?] + -0.000294 * [Length of new CEO retention] – 0.00551 *
[Outcome of unsuccessful CEO] – 0.000808 * [If unsuccessful retained, Hostile Resignation?] –
0 * [New CEO Tenure in pre-merger] + [Year dummy variables]

Where:
•

	
  

MAR = market-adjusted return, monthly over 10 years

Leadership Succession in a Merger of Equals (Cheng) - 12

•

Time = time period (1 month each) after merger

•

Co-CEOship = Form of new leadership, where 0 = single CEO and 1 = co-CEO

•

If co-CEO, intended resulting new CEO? = If Co-CEOs, intended resulting CEO? Where
0 = no and 1 = yes

•

Length of New CEO retention = length of new CEO retention in merged company

•

Outcome of unsuccessful CEO = What is the outcome of the unsuccessful CEO? 0 =
released, 1 = retained

•

If unsuccessful retained, Hostile Resignation? = If the unsuccessful CEO was retained,
was there a hostile departure? Where 0 = no and 1 = yes

•

New CEO Tenure in pre-merger = new CEO tenure in pre-merger company

•

Year dummy variables = control for year-specific factors

[See Appendix D]

These results seem to suggest that employing a co-CEO structure directly as a result of an
MOE has the strongest relationship with post-merger financial success, as the positive coefficient
of this variable has the largest magnitude of all the resulting variable coefficients; nonetheless,
the relationship is not significant.
Retention practices of unsuccessful CEOs are next most noteworthy with respect to
coefficient magnitude, though the results are still insignificant. The output seems to indicate that
retention of unsuccessful CEOs tend to be somewhat negatively correlated with financial
success. This might suggest that, in an MOE, it is better to simply release the unsuccessful CEO
to better facilitate post-merger transition.
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Of the remaining output, surprisingly the presence of a succession plan in the event of a
co-CEOship is negatively correlated with long-term financial returns, which contrasts with the
initial hypothesis. The Length of New CEO retention as well as New CEO Tenure in pre-merger
company are also both slightly negative, which is not too surprising given the initial evaluation
of the dataset in which values for both measures varied quite a bit across the different MOEs.
Finally, the coefficient for the Time variable was slightly positive, suggesting that, in
general, financial returns for companies tend to improve with the passage of time. Perhaps this
indicates that the passage of time can undo many of the effects of leadership succession on MOE
financial success.

IV. Analysis of Findings and Further Research
There are a number of reasons that might explain the insignificance of the results
obtained from the multivariate regression, which spurred additional studies.

Additional Study: Varying Time Periods
First of all, the time series chosen for financial returns may have been too long. It is
possible that the impact of leadership succession characteristics on company financial success is
limited to the few years after the merger, in which case including a full ten-year period may have
diluted these distinguishable effects.
Accordingly, an addendum to the study was conducted in which the regression was re-run
over varying time periods to see if there is variance in short-term versus long-term results [See
Appendix E]. The addendum ran the regression over abridged periods of 7 years, 5 years, and
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then 3 years. A table comparing the coefficients for each variable under the different time
frames is below:
Coefficient
Time
co-CEO
Intended resulting new CEO?
Length of new CEO retention
Outcome of Unsuccessful CEO
Hostile Resignation
New CEO Tenure in pre company

3-year
0.000683
0.032716
-0.001691
0.000239
-0.005753
0.009257
0.001556

5-year
0.000216
0.030294
-0.001732
-0.000159
-0.004909
0.010285
0.000935

7-year
0.000301
0.025643
-0.000001
-0.000208
-0.006572
0.002287
0.000362

10-year
0.000137
0.020265
-0.002127
-0.000294
-0.005510
-0.000808
-0.000041

The dilution effect seems to be confirmed by the decrease in magnitude of the positive
coefficient for Time; as the time period is lengthened, the passage of time is generally less
strongly correlated with financial returns, though these coefficients are not statistically
significant.
The trend in the data seems to suggest that the effect of co-CEOship, Length of new CEO
retention, and New CEO Tenure in pre-merger company on financial returns of the MOE
decreases with the lengthening of the time period in question. In fact, the coefficient for “Length
of new CEO retention” goes from positive to negative between the 3-year and 5-year time frames
and the coefficient for “New CEO Tenure in pre-merger company” also does so from the 7-year
to 10-year output. It is possible that the financial returns associated with “New CEO Tenure in
pre-merger company” decreases with the time frame because the longer a very tenured CEO
stays with a company post-MOE, the less they are able to turn out financial returns. For
example, a CEO that has a long tenure in the company might be good from transition purposes
but by 10 years after the merger, their expertise in merger integration is no longer salient and in
fact their tenure might make them less inclined to initiate necessary and beneficial changes to the
company, causing financial returns to taper off with time. In a similar way, the fact that the
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coefficient for “Length of new CEO Retention” goes from positive to negative within 3-5 years
suggests that, within this timeframe, the length of a CEO’s retention post-merger peaks, after
which companies that refresh their CEO position experience higher financial returns. This might
be due to increased creativity and innovation of a new CEO and willingness to try new methods
or perhaps the age of the CEO becomes important. The effect of co-CEOs remains positive
across all the timeframes measured but decreases in magnitude; this suggests that the existence
of co-CEOs post-MOE is generally associated with positive financial returns but whatever is the
effect of initial co-CEOship on financial returns is diluted with time and other factors become
more salient in boosting company performance. Nonetheless, even under the three year output,
none of these coefficients register as statistically significant.
With regards to the other variables, the coefficient for existence of a succession plan
under a co-CEO structure is negative and its magnitude generally increases with the passage of
time. This might indicate that, along with the existence of such a plan come some other merger
integration facilitators that manifest their effects in the longer-term, such as other succession and
integration planning. The magnitude of the coefficient for retention of unsuccessful CEO
fluctuates with the time periods and does not display a meaningful pattern, but it is negative
across all time periods suggesting that retention of unsuccessful CEOs is correlated with lower
financial returns. This is surprising, as many firms choose to retain their unsuccessful CEOs
post-merger, likely for employee morale purposes. It is possible that such retention
compromises the merger integration process, as it confounds or complicates the adoption of a
post-merger culture. In contrast, the coefficient for hostile resignation of unsuccessful CEO is
positive and increases when the time period shifts from 3 years to 5 years, but then decreases in
longer time periods and even becomes negative under a 10- year period. This finding is also
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surprising; it is possible that a hostile resignation increases higher financial returns in the short
run by providing a clear statement on the leadership – and corresponding cultural – direction of
the company. However, in the long term, a hostile resignation might be an indicator of less
desirable working conditions imposed by management in a way that is ultimately detrimental to
financial performance. As before, the coefficients for these variables under varying time periods
are not statistically significant.

Additional study: Event Study
An even more extreme form of truncating the timeframe of MOE returns is through an
event study. Event studies determine the effect of an event on the value of the firm, which is
assumed to be reflected in daily stock returns in a short time period directly after the event,
usually a matter of days. In this event study, the event is the MOE and the date (t = 0) is the
date the merger was formally announced. The impact of the event, then, is measured by the
abnormal returns of the firm’s security over a designated time window. Abnormal returns were
measured for both pre-merger companies of an MOE. The event window that I used was 20 days
prior and 20 days post the MOE announcement date.

In an event study, abnormal returns are calculated as follows:
ARiT= RiT – E(RiT | XT)
(MacKinlay)
Where:
ARiT = Abnormal returns for firm “i” on event date “T”
RiT = Actual returns for firm “i” on event date “T”
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E(RiT | XT) = Normal return for firm “i” over the event window period
This normal return [E(RiT | XT)] can be calculated using either the constant mean return
model or the market model (MacKinlay). In running event studies for the MOE data, I used both
the constant mean return model and the market model. In the constant mean return model, the
“normal return” was the average of the security’s returns in the period [-100, -21]. In the market
model, the “normal return” was based off a linear relationship between the S&P500 Returns and
the security’s returns in the period [-100, -21]. I was able to compare the actual returns of the
securities over the event window to these projected “normal returns” and thus calculate
“abnormal returns.”
After calculating the abnormal returns for each security over the time window under the
two methodologies, I examined the data in two ways.
First, I determined if the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the securities were
significant over varying time periods [-1, 1], [-3, 3], [-5, 5], [-10, 10], [-20, 20]. The output is as
follows:
Constant Mean Return Model

Average CAR
Std. Dev. CAR
t-stat

CAR [-1,1]
0.04095
0.075212
0.544464

CAR[-3,3]
0.035242
0.082479
0.427281

CAR [-5,5]
0.022181
0.070855
0.31304

CAR [-10, 10]
0.00013
0.102815
0.001265

CAR [-20,20]
-0.00104
0.124805
-0.00831

Market Model

Average CAR
Std. Dev. CAR
t-stat

	
  

CAR [-1,1]
0.041932
0.082953
0.505495

CAR[-3,3] CAR [-5,5]
0.041557
0.027742
0.086556
0.069942
0.480117
0.39665

CAR [-10, 10] CAR [-20,20]
0.007439
0.004036
0.096314
0.120239
0.077234
0.03357
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The two models yielded similar results. Under both models, the Average CAR is positive
under all the time periods except to [-20, 20] time frame on the constant mean return model. In
both models, the CAR also decreased with the expansion of the event window, as is expected –
abnormal returns are expected to be greatest immediately around the event date. Nevertheless,
none of the average CAR values are statistically significant. This is surprising because the
announcement of a merger typically has a significant positive effect on stock returns. Possible
reasons why the CAR measures for these MOEs are not statistically significant is because of the
limited dataset, lack of public confidence specifically in mergers of equals that is then reflected
in lukewarm stock price increases, or selection of time period for determining expected normal
returns under both the Constant Mean Return Model and the Market Model.
Second, I regressed the Constant Mean Return Model CARs of time periods [-1,1], [-3,3],
and [-5,5] against the characteristics of MOE leadership succession for each of the pre-MOE
companies examined in the original study4 [See Appendix F]. The output is as follows:

CAR
Form of new
interval
Leadership
[-1,1]
0.12399994*
[-3,3]
0.1206418*
[-5,5]
0.1154511*
*statistically significant

CEO
Succession
Plan
-0.137543*
-0.159398*
-0.135041*

Unsuccessful
CEO
-0.055697
-0.050039
-0.048355

New CEO
Tenure in PreMerger
Company
-0.002105
-0.000953
-0.001544

In the short term, the public seems to have confidence in the presence of a co-CEO
structure, as the coefficient for “Form of new leadership” is positively correlated with financial
returns across all three CAR intervals, and these measures are statistically significant.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
4

The “New CEO Retention” variable was omitted in the event study; while it is applicable for the original
study, this information – how long the “new CEO” stays in position post-merger, is not known to
anybody at the time of the merger and is also unpredictable. Thus, this variable cannot reasonably have
an effect on abnormal returns. The “Hostile Resignation” variable was omitted for this same reason.

	
  

Leadership Succession in a Merger of Equals (Cheng) - 19

Announcement of a CEO succession plan along with the merger is, surprisingly, negatively
correlated with the short-term CARs, and these measures are also statistically significant.
Perhaps this reflects skepticism in the chosen CEO successors rather than the presence of a
succession plan itself.
The coefficients for “Unsuccessful CEO” and “New CEO Tenure in Pre-Merger
Company” are not statistically significant. Interestingly, retention of the unsuccessful CEO is
not correlated with higher financial returns right at the outset of the merger announcement.
Perhaps the public does not favor retention of the unsuccessful CEO due to concerns of this
retention hindering cultural integration or similar concerns in choice of successful versus
unsuccessful CEO. This disfavor decreases slightly with longer CAR intervals, but these
correlations are not statistically significant. The correlation between New CEO Tenure in PreMerger company and short-term financial returns is very close to zero but slightly negative; they
do not show a consistent pattern over across the CAR intervals. This might reflect the great
variance in tenure values in the dataset.

Additional Study: Inclusion of Previously Omitted MOEs
A third weakness of the original study is that the original dataset is likely skewed.
Because the original dataset of 40 MOEs had been narrowed down to 16 that had 10-year
financial data, the resulting data points are effectively biased in that they are the ones that
“survived” and succeeded. Thus, these MOEs are likely more high-performing, which
confounds the distinction between the financial returns.
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As such, an addition to the study revisited the original 40 MOEs and incorporated MOEs
that had previously been omitted from the original study on the following grounds:

•

The MOE was later absorbed by another company through a merger/acquisition in
such a way that the original MOE lost its identity and could not be distinguished from
the newly merged company

•

The MOE ultimately failed and ceased to exist as a company

19 MOEs from the original 40 fell under either of these two categories. The additional
study, then, incorporated the 16 MOEs that succeeded as well as the 19 MOEs that, within a 10year period, disappeared. Of the original 40, 5 MOEs were never consummated, so they
continued to remain omitted from the dataset.
In compiling data for this additional study, it became evident that the variables of study
needed to be revised from the original set. The variables – applied to both the original 16 MOEs
and the previously omitted 19 MOEs – are as follows:

Control variables for Fate of the MOE: “Absorbed,” “Failed” or “Succeeded” where each
variable could take on values of either “0” or “1” and [Absorbed + Failed + Succeeded = 1] for
each MOE. The 16 MOEs from the original study were all categorized as “Succeeded,” and of
the 19 previously omitted MOEs, 17 were “Absorbed” into subsequent mergers while 2 “Failed”
(Cendant and Friede Goldman Halter) either through bankruptcy or acquisition by a Private
Equity firm.
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CEO Type: “CEO[co]”, “CEO[only]”, “CEO[A]”, “CEO[B]” where the original study only
accounted for two forms of CEO structure: single CEO vs. co-CEO. Inclusion of the previously
omitted 19 MOEs also introduced a greater variety of CEO structures as well as a more accurate
methodology of accounting for CEO succession. “CEO[co]” denotes a co-CEO structure, which
eventually would lead to a single CEO structure. “CEO[only]” is when there is only a single
CEO resulting from the merger and this position is not associated with a succession plan; for the
purposes of the merger, this individual is the “only CEO” associated. “CEO[A]” and “CEO[B],”
then, allow for a more robust examination of CEO succession. Specifically, “CEO[A]” would be
the first leader of an MOE after its execution but is always succeeded by another CEO associated
with the merger; in most cases, this is through a clear succession plan. “CEO[B]” is the second
leader after the execution of the MOE; it can follow either “CEO[A]” or “CEO[co]” where in
“CEO[co]” there is not one designated CEO but there still exists some leader before “CEO[B]”
ascends to the position. Under this methodology, it is possible for an MOE to have values for the
following pairs: “CEO[A]” and “CEO[B],” “CEO[co]” and “CEO[B].” However, it is not
possible to have values for both “CEO[co]” and “CEO[A],” nor is it possible to have a value for
“CEO[only]” with any other CEO Type variable.
Whereas previous methodology typically counted “CEO[B]” as the new CEO and
ignored “CEO[A],” many of the previously omitted 19 MOEs exist on shorter timeline than the
16 original MOEs due to subsequent mergers of company failures; as such, even though
“CEO[B]” may still be the CEO intended to have a greater effect post-merger, many MOEs in
the revised dataset never have their “CEO[B]”s ascend, and so incorporation of “CEO[A]” data
is necessary and appropriate. This revised methodology is better able to account for the variety
of succession patterns across the MOE data points.
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In the event of a transition, either from {CEO[co]  CEO[B]} or {CEO[A]  CEO[B]},
values [0,1] for the respective CEO Type were matched to the years that structure was in place to
best match the CEO Type (co, only, A, B) to corresponding financial returns. There were a few
cases – particularly in the previously omitted 19 MOEs – where a CEO[B] is identified through a
succession plan but the company is either absorbed or fails before the transition is able to occur.
The methodology is not altered for such cases – as a result, for such MOEs, only CEO[A] of the
CEO Types will have values for the duration of the MOE.

Succession Plan: where [0] = no and [1] = yes. This is slightly revised from the original
methodology in that the original only accounted for a succession plan given a co-CEO structure.
The revised methodology accounts for any sort of succession plan – whether for a co-CEO
structure or a singular pre-established {CEO[A]  CEO[B]} transition. Note that the presence
of a succession plan was considered independently of how well the company followed this preestablished plan; many times, companies would plan for a transition from {CEO[A]CEO[B]}
in “X” number of years but make the transition either earlier or later than planned. The true
timing of the transition is reflected in the values for the CEO Type, but this particular variable
focuses solely on the presence of a succession plan at the time of the MOE. Similarly to the
original study, the values retrieved for this variable might be slightly skewed given not every
MOE that has a succession plan may publicize it, but publicizing of succession plans was
prevalent enough to include it as a variable of interest.

Retention of CEO: “CEO[only] Retention,” “CEO[A] Retention,” and “CEO[B] Retention” to
best match the retention values to the CEO Type. If the CEO Type for the MOE is CEO[only],
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then only “CEO[only] Retention” will have values reflecting how long this CEO was retained in
the post-merger MOE. For MOEs of the previously omitted 19 that were later absorbed by other
mergers, the “CEO[only] Retention” is truncated with the subsequent merger, even if the
CEO[only] retains a leadership position in the new, post-MOE company. This is in order to
maintain consistency between the values for this variable with the MOE financial returns. If
there is both a CEO[A] and CEO[B], the Retention values for each time period of an MOE are
matched with the concurrent CEO.

Tenure of CEO: “CEO[only] Tenure,” “CEO[A] Tenure,” “CEO[B] Tenure,” with the same
methodology as described for the “Retention of CEO” variable. “Tenure” is counted specifically
for leadership positions in the pre-merger company – instead of total tenure, which for some
CEOs can be decades. This is to maintain consistency and meaningful values across this
variable.

Outcome of unsuccessful CEO? [0] = released and [1] = retained; the unsuccessful CEO is the
other frontrunner CEO that is not chosen as the “New CEO.” In a transition from {CEO[co] 
CEO[B]}, CEO[A] would be the “unsuccessful CEO.” In a succession where {CEO[A] 
CEO[B]}, CEO[B] is considered the “unsuccessful CEO” because this individual does not first
obtain the position.

Hostile resignation? Same methodology as original study.
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This additional study yielded interesting results [See Appendix G]. The output yields two
statistically significant variable coefficients, the first being that MOEs absorbed by subsequent
mergers have performance 1.1% higher than MOEs that ultimately succeeded – namely, the
original 16 MOEs. Not surprisingly, MOEs that failed have performance 0.1% lower than
MOEs that succeeded, though this measure is not statistically significant.
To further explore the coefficients for the Fate of MOE variables (“Absorbed,” “Failed,”
and “Succeeded”), the additional study was re-run aggregating “Absorbed and Failed” into a
“Did not Succeed” category, which was Zeroed out in the regression output against the
“Succeeded” variable in order to get a value for “Succeeded” [See Appendix H]. The
aggregation of these two variables might have provided a more accurate regression, given the
“Failed” variable in the original additional study only had two data points, giving them undue
weight in the ultimate output. In the results, companies that succeeded have financial returns
that are 0.8% lower than firms that fell into the “Did not Succeed” category, and this measure
was statistically significant. This might be explained by cultural integration difficulties; in
Weber, et. al’s experiment simulating the effect of merger integration on post-merger
performance, the experiment found that “the merged group” – serving as a proxy for a merged
company – “is (on average) never able to complete the task in this [pre-merger] amount of time
or less in any of the 10 postmerger rounds” (11). Thus, post-merger productivity is
compromised due to difficulties involved with – or simply the process of - cultural integration;
this output is likely reflecting that finding. Another possible reason for this finding is that the
“Did not succeed” variable is being regressed only across returns of firms before their
subsequent mergers or failures, many of which happened within just a few years of the original
MOE. In contrast, the data points of the “Succeeded category” include the full set of financial
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returns for the MOE for 10 years post-merger. By truncating the “Did not succeed” financial
returns, it is difficult to accurately compare them to the full financial returns of the firms that
“Succeeded.” A possible additional study would compare these firms over the course of a
standardized post-merger timeframe and see if firms that ultimately “Did not succeed” still have
statistically significant higher returns than firms that “Succeeded” across this standardized time
period.
In re-running the Additional Study with the aggregation of the “Did not Succeed”
variables, the coefficients for the other variables shifted slightly, as is reasonable in finding a
regression of best fit amongst multiple variables [See Appendix I]. One change to note is that of
the Succession Plan; the coefficient for the disaggregated “Fate of MOE” was positive, but when
the variables were aggregated the coefficient became negative, signifying a 800% decrease in
coefficient value. The reason for this drastic change in coefficient is unclear, but it may suggest
that the two mergers in the “Failed” category in the study with the disaggregated “Fates” were
driving the original coefficient. Especially since the two failed mergers – Cendant and Friede
Goldman Halter, both of which went bankrupt - had higher financial returns and both also had
Succession Plans, the disaggregation of these points in the regression may have inflated the
“Succession Plan” coefficient.
In considering why the “Absorbed” variable has a statistically significant positive
coefficient in the first Additional Study (disaggregated “Fate of MOE” variables), it is possible
that the financial returns are not positive because the company was later absorbed by a
subsequent merger but rather the reverse: that the MOE’s higher financial returns in the short
period post-merger made these companies more attractive for subsequent acquisition.
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The other coefficient that is statistically significant in the first Additional Study
(disaggregated “Fate of MOE” variables) is that of the presence of a CEO[A]. Under the
methodology, the presence of a CEO[A] is only possible when there is a clear succession plan
from one CEO to another but specifically without the structure of a co-CEOship. Having a
CEO[A] is associated by lower financial returns by 2.8%; having co-CEOs is associated with
lower financial returns by 1.2% and have a single CEO through the merger (“CEO[only]”) is
associated with lower financial returns by 0.5%, though the latter two measures are not
statistically significant. This might suggest that having a stable CEO or even a co-CEO structure
is associated with higher financial returns than a succession plan between individual CEOs.
A possible reason why the presence of CEO[A] might have a statistically significant
relationship with financial returns can be traced to its implications for cultural integration, which,
as mentioned earlier, has been cited by industry literature as a significant but difficult to measure
culprit for merger failure. In every instance that a company from the MOE dataset had a
CEO[A], the succeeding CEO[B] was from the other pre-merger company. The underlying
reasons for such a succession format might have been to protect employee morale, as giving both
CEOs their time at the top spot might strike employees as more “fair,” even if their respective
CEO retains that position for just a short period of time. However, it is true that CEO
personalities often reflect the culture of their original companies; if, every time there exists a
CEO[A] and that CEO[A] transitions to a CEO[B] from a different company, that can be likened
to the MOE going from culture[A] to culture [B]. Under the reasonable assumption that even
culturally compatible companies must have some differences, a {CEO[A]CEO[B]} succession
must lead to an extended and more complex cultural integration – potentially even more so than
under a co-CEO structure. As cited in Weber’s study, a McKinsey recommendation for merging
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companies suggested that the newly merged group or company work on a new task together
instead of trying to merge two existing methods for tasks familiar to both pre-merger companies
(15). In a similar way, starting off the post-merger period with a co-CEO structure forces the
new firm to merge the two cultures from the outset; in contrast, a {CEO[A]  CEO[B]}
transition perpetuates the pre-existing culture of whichever CEO holds the position at that time,
which is then imposed upon the merged company.
CEO[B] does not have the same issues as does CEO[A] because a CEO[B] can arise from
two different scenarios – succeeding a CEO[A] or succeeding a co-CEOship - and the effect of a
CEO[B] under each of the two scenarios cannot be disaggregated in this data.
Interestingly, while the presence of CEO[A] has a statistically significant detrimental
effect to financial returns, longer retention of CEO[A] in the position is associated with higher
financial returns, though this finding is not significant. This is in contrast with the original study,
in which longer Retention of the “new CEO” was associated with lower financial returns.
Longer retention of CEO[only] and CEO[B] have results in line with the original study, though
these findings are also not statistically significant.
In contrast with the original study, the retention of the unsuccessful CEO as well as the
prevalence of a hostile resignation are positively associated with financial returns, though not
statistically significant; the first of these findings is in line with the original hypothesis, but the
second is not.
Finally, similar to the original study, measures of CEO tenure in pre-merger company
seem to have negligible effects on financial returns, as these variables have coefficients close to
zero and are not statistically significant.
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In light of the results from the additional studies, there are a few other reasons that
might explain why the original study did not yield significant results. First of all, there are too
few data points to draw any significant conclusions. This is due to the fact that MOEs, as they
are defined, are quite rare. Even extending the initial timeframe over which I compiled MOEs
that occurred – say, from one decade to two – would not yield enough data points to make the
outcome significantly more meaningful. Additionally, extending the timeframe would
incorporate additional concerns regarding stationarity of the data and the changing landscape of
M&As over such a broad time period. This weakness of the study hinges upon the content of the
study itself.
The lack of data points also makes it more difficult to identify outlier data points. The
variables “New CEO Retention” and “Tenure in pre-merger company” are particularly
susceptible to outliers, as they measure number of years a CEO has this relationship with the
company. The range of values for “New CEO Retention” go from 1 year to 14 years; the
average value is 6.3 years with a standard deviation of 4.06 years, which is quite varied. “Tenure
in pre-merger company” is similarly volatile; the range is 1-22 years, and the average tenure is
9.8 years with a standard deviation of 7 years. Because there are a number of different factors
that may affect the values for these variables and they vary so widely amongst so few data
points, it is difficult to find a meaningful correlation between these measures and company
financial returns.
Multicollinearity amongst the variables chosen for the original study may also have
contributed to the insignificant output values. For example, the decision to retain the
unsuccessful CEO might be related to the presence of a co-CEOship after the MOE. It is also
possible that Length of New CEO Retention is related to the New CEO’s tenure in pre-merger

	
  

Leadership Succession in a Merger of Equals (Cheng) - 29

company, as mentioned earlier. If such relationships do exist, including multiple related
variables will simply diminish each of their incremental effects on the financial returns in the
multivariate regression, rendering them all insignificant. Additional studies would examine the
choice in variables and their relationship to one another to decrease the instances of
multicollinearity.
Finally, it is possible that there is just not a significant relation between leadership
succession and financial success of firms, as per the stance proposed by Organizational Ecology.
If this is true, then it has important implications for mergers: the choice of leadership succession
is not important in how the merged company fares thereafter, even in such an extreme case as an
MOE. Nonetheless, the high failure rate of mergers remains, and so research should shift
attention to other salient factors such as cultural and operational integration to identify and
address the main challenges facing mergers today.
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Appendix A: 40 MOEs identified from 2001 Wulf study
Company 1

Company 2

Year merged

Bell Atlantic Corp.

GTE Corp.

2000

Travelers Group

Citicorp

1998

NBD Bancorp, Inc.

First Chicago Corp.

1995

PECO Energy Co.

Unicom Corp.

2000

NationsBank Corp.

BankAmerica Corp.

1998

Nevada Power Co.

Sierra Pacific Resources

1999

First Security Financial Corp.

Omni Capital Group

1992

Staples, inc.

Office Depot, Inc.

Not completed

Wisconsin Energy Corp.

Northern States Power Co.

Not completed

Indiana Energy, Inc.

SIGCORP, Inc.

2000

Chateau Properties

ROC Communities

1997

Premier Bancshares, inc.

Central & Southern Holding Co.

1997

Pinnacle Financial Services

Indiana Federal Corp.

1997

Ocean Energy, Inc.

United Meridian Corporation

1998

Society Corp

KeyCorp

1994

Associated BancCorp

First Financial Corporation

1997

ASARCO Incorporated

Cyprus Amax Minerals Company

Not completed

CapStar Hotel Co.

American General Hospitality Corp.

1998

Charter One Financial, Inc.

FirstFed Michigan Corporation

1995

LG&E Energy Corp.

KU Energy Corp

1998

Bell Atlantic Corp.

NYNEX Corp.

1997

BB&T Financial Corp.

Southern National Co.

1995

CUC International Inc.

HFS, Inc.

1997

Chemical Banking Corp.

Chase Manhattan Corp.

1996

FCB Financial Corp.

OSB Financial Corp.

1997

Falcon Drilling Company, Inc.

Reading & Bates Corporation

1997

Durco International Inc.

BW/IP, Inc.

1997

Promus Hotel Corp.

Doubletree Corp.

1997

Hinsdale Financial Corp.

Liberty Bancorp, Inc.

1997

Foundation Health Corp.
Friede Goldman International,
Inc.

Health Systems International, Inc.

1997

Halter Marine Group, Inc.

1999

Fred Meyer, Inc.

Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc.

1997

MindSpring Enterprises, Inc.

EarthLink Network, Inc.

2000

Martin Marietta Corp.

Lockheed Corp.

1995

Little Falls Bancorp, Inc.

Skylands Community Bank

Not completed

UtiliCorp United Inc.

Kansas City Power & Light Co.

Not completed

Commercial Bancorp

West Coast Bancorp

1995

Company

MotivePower Industries, Inc.

1999

Dean Witter, Discover & Co.

Morgan Stanley Group, Inc.

1997

Monsanto Co.

Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc.

2000

Westinghouse Air Brake

Source: Wulf
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Appendix B: 16 MOEs remaining for this study

Company 1

Company 2

Bell Atlantic Corp.
Travelers Group
PECO Energy Co.
NationsBank Corp.
Nevada Power Co.
Indiana Energy, Inc.
Society Corp

GTE Corp.
Citicorp
Unicom Corp.
BankAmerica Corp.
Sierra Pacific Resources
SIGCORP, Inc.
KeyCorp
First Financial
Associated BancCorp
Corporation
American General
CapStar Hotel Co.
Hospitality Corp.
BB&T Financial Corp. Southern National Co.
Durco International Inc. BW/IP, Inc.
Health Systems
Foundation Health Corp. International, Inc.
MindSpring Enterprises,
Inc.
EarthLink Network, Inc.
Martin Marietta Corp.
Lockheed Corp.
Commercial Bancorp
West Coast Bancorp

Year
merged
2000
1998
2000
1998
1999
2000
1994

VZ
C
EXC
BAC
NVE
VVC
KEY

1997

Associated Banc-Corp

ASBC

1998
1995
1997

MeriStar Hospitality
BB&T
Flowserve
Foundation Health
Systems

MHX
BBT
FLS

Earthlink
Lockheed Martin
West Coast Bank
Westinghouse Air Brake
Technologies
Corporation; Wabtec
Corporation

ELNK
LMT
WCBO

1997
2000
1995
1995

Westinghouse Air Brake MotivePower Industries,
Company
Inc.
1999

	
  

Stock
Ticker

New Company Name
Verizon
Communications, Inc.
Citigroup Inc.
Exelon Corporation
Bank of America
NV Energy
Vectren Corp.
KeyCorp
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Appendix C: Data on leadership succession factors for 16 MOEs

Company 1
Bell Atlantic
Corp.
Travelers
Group
PECO Energy
Co.
NationsBank
Corp.
Nevada
Power Co.
Indiana
Energy, Inc.
Society Corp
Associated
BancCorp

GTE Corp.

Year
Stock
merged New Company Name Ticker
Verizon
2000
Communications, Inc.
VZ

Citicorp

1998

Company 2

Unicom Corp. 2000
BankAmerica
Corp.
1998
Sierra Pacific
Resources
1999
SIGCORP,
Inc.
2000
KeyCorp
1994
First Financial
Corporation 1997
American
General
CapStar Hotel Hospitality
Co.
Corp.
1998
BB&T
Financial
Southern
Corp.
National Co. 1995
Durco
International
Inc.
BW/IP, Inc. 1997
Health
Systems
Foundation International,
Health Corp. Inc.
1997
MindSpring
Enterprises, EarthLink
Inc.
Network, Inc. 2000
Martin
Marietta
Lockheed
Corp.
Corp.
1995
Commercial West Coast
Bancorp
Bancorp
1995
Westinghouse MotivePower
Air Brake
Industries,
Company
Inc.
1999
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1 = yes) n

If
Unsuccessful
CEO
Outcome of retained [1],
Unsuccessful Hostile
CEO (0 = Resignation?
released, 1 = (0 = no, 1 =
retained)
yes)

New
CEO
Tenure
in premerger
compan
y

1

1

11

1

0

9

C

1

0

8

1

1

12

Exelon Corporation

EXC

1

1

12

1

0

2

Bank of America

BAC

1

1

3

1

1

15

NV Energy

NVE

0

-

1

1

1

1

Vectren Corp.
KeyCorp

VVC
KEY

0
1

1

10
7

1
1

0
0

20
9

Associated Banc-Corp

ASBC

0

-

3

1

0

22

MeriStar Hospitality

MHX

0

-

8

1

0

20

BB&T

BBT

0

-

14

0

0

17

Flowserve

FLS

0

-

3

1

1

2

Foundation Health
Systems

HNT

0

-

1

1

1

4

Earthlink

ELNK

0

-

7

1

1

4

Lockheed Martin

LMT

1

1

2

1

0

8

WCBO

0

-

4

1

1

3

WAB

0

-

7

0

0

9

Citigroup Inc.

West Coast Bank
Westinghouse Air
Brake Technologies
Corporation (Wabtec
Corporation)
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Appendix D: Multivariate Regression Output on 16 MOEs
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Appendix E: Additional Study – Varying Time Periods, Multivariate Regression output

3-year Financial Returns
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5-year Financial Returns
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7-year Financial Returns
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Appendix F: Additional Study – Event Study, Multivariate Regression Output
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Appendix G: Additional Study – Inclusion of Previously Omitted MOEs, Multivariate
Regression Output
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Appendix H: Re-Run Additional Study – Inclusion of Previously Omitted MOEs,
Multivariate Regression Output with aggregated “Absorbed” and “Failed” variables

	
  

Leadership Succession in a Merger of Equals (Cheng) - 43

Appendix I: Additional Study – comparison table of output from Disaggregated and
Aggregated “Fate of CEO” variables: “Absorbed,” “Failed,” and “Succeeded”

Time
Did not Succeed
Absorbed
Failed

Succeeded
CEO (co)
CEO(only
Succession Plan
CEO(A)
CEO(B)
CEO(only) Retention
CEO(A) Retention
CEO(B) Retention
Outcome of
unsuccessful?
Hostile Resignation?
CEO(only) Tenure
CEO(A) Tenure
CEO(B) Tenure

	
  

Disaggregated Fate
of MOE variables
-0.000036
Not included in
study

Aggregated Fate
of MOE variables
-0.00003318

0.001111

(Zeroed)
Not included in
study
Not included in
study

(Zeroed)
-0.012016
-0.005893
0.0002827
-0.028241*
(Zeroed)
-0.000192
0.0014847
-0.000414

-0.008416*
-0.013625
-0.007529
-0.002266
-0.030845*
(Zeroed)
-0.000131
0.0015277*
-0.000637

0.0009084
0.0010603
0.000067944
0.0002277
-0.000326

0.0019252
-0.000003056
5.8145E-07
0.0003413
-0.000382

0.0110834*
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